Professor Prior and Jonathan Edwards

Review of Metaphysics 16 (2):366 - 373 (1962)
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Abstract

The particular argument which Prior selects is supposed to show that the Arminian hypothesis, viz. volitions are uncaused events, has consequences that are logically unacceptable or at any rate counterintuitive. Prior makes two claims: Edwards' argument depends on false metaphysical premises. When these are revised, uncaused events, e.g., volitions, may be acknowledged without embarrassment. If the scope of Edwards' argument is restricted, then it is, in Prior's phrase, "entirely cogent." I shall try to show that Prior is mistaken on both points: the argument in question is not--at least not on any interpretation that I can think of--cogent at all, but it does serve to raise an interesting question of which Prior takes no account.

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