Abstract

The primary purpose of this paper is to show that the future of mind/body dualism lies not in its Cartesian form, but instead in a richer formulation of a form/matter dualism. The changes in our idea of a human being since Aristotle can be traced through Aquinas, Descartes and Spinoza as a movement from an emphasis on humans as rational animals to humans as rational beings. This is a fundamental change that affects the way in which nature as a whole is viewed. The underpinnings of this shift manifest themselves as changes in the concepts of substance, cause and soul. ;I begin with a discussion of Aristotle's accounts of the form/matter duality, causation, and substance, emphasizing the animate/inanimate distinction. Next, I discuss Thomas Aquinas' treatment of Aristotle's concepts of form, substance, and soul, and show how these concepts were altered as a result of Aquinas' attempt to introduce Christianity into Aristotelian philosophy. I proceed to a discussion of Descartes' philosophy of mind, with an emphasis on his reformulation of the concept of "substance" to mean merely independent existence and on his equating the human soul with mind. The last chapter is a discussion of Spinoza's philosophy of mind. Spinoza takes up Descartes' definition of substance and carries it to its logical conclusion. I contend however, that in his attempt to eliminate the Cartesian problem of interaction, Spinoza merely ends up widening the gap between mind and body. ;In my estimation, the future of mind/body dualism lies in a conception of humans as both rational and natural beings, emphasizing the similarities as well as the differences between them and other animals. In order for this to be possible, it is necessary to cease emphasizing the rationality and intellect of humans as their defining characteristic. One way to conceive of humans along these lines is some version of an Aristotelian form/matter dualism that stresses our kinship with animals as self-moving, animate beings