Metaphysical Infinitism and the Regress of Being

Metaphilosophy 45 (2):232-244 (2014)
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Abstract

This article offers a limited defense of metaphysical “infinitism,” the view that there are, or might be, infinite chains of ontological dependence. According to a widespread presupposition, there must be an ultimate ground of being—most likely, a plurality of fundamental atoms. Contrary to this view, this article shows that metaphysical infinitism is internally coherent. In particular, a parallel with the debate concerning infinitism about epistemic justification is suggested, and an “emergence model” of being is put forward. According to the emergence model, the being of any given entity gradually arises out of an infinite series of progressively less dependent entities—it is not wholly transmitted, as it were, from a basic, ungrounded level to all the dependent ones in a step-by-step fashion. Some objections are considered and rebutted

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Matteo Morganti
Università degli Studi Roma Tre

Citations of this work

Fundamentality.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Ontological Dependence.Tuomas E. Tahko & E. J. Lowe - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Varieties of Metaphysical Coherentism.Jan Swiderski - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (5):1861-1886.
What Work the Fundamental?Ricki Leigh Bliss - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):359-379.

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References found in this work

Monism: The Priority of the Whole.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):31-76.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.
Universals and scientific realism.David Malet Armstrong - 1978 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Theory of knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 2000 - Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

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