On Legal Interpretation and Second-order Proof Rules

Analisi E Diritto 1 (1):165-184 (2018)
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Abstract

This paper puts forward three critiques of pardo’s second-order proof rules thesis. The first criticism states that these rules are not suitable to guide the interpretation of standards of proof rules because they confuse matters of legal interpretation with matters of epistemology. The second criticism states that second-order proof rules are affected by the same indeterminacy problems they are designed to resolve, thereby rendering them unsuitable for the task they are purposely designed for. The third criticism renders pardo’s proposal redundant. a reconceptualization of second-order proof rules is offered.

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Sebastián Reyes Molina
Uppsala University

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References found in this work

Evidence Matters: Science, Proof, and Truth in the Law.Susan Haack - 2014 - New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Juridical proof and the best explanation.Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen - 2007 - Law and Philosophy 27 (3):223 - 268.
Legal Indeterminacy.Brian Leiter - 1995 - Legal Theory 1 (4):481-492.

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