Moral Attention: Toward a Liberationist Ethics of Everyday Life

Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh (1998)
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Abstract

I develop and critique the notions of moral attention as derived by Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch, in order to transform the notion of moral attention and its moral-epistemic commitments into ones which are more tenable. I link this transformed conception of moral attention to current thought on 'constitutive luck' , how chance contributes to who we are and to who we become. In particular, I focus upon our 'social locations,' our positions as embodied particular beings within specific cultures, historical contexts, societies, and positionings via power relations along such lines as race, sex, sexuality, class, and nation. ;I build upon Barbara Harlow's examinations of 'resistance literature' and Ngugi wa Thiong'o's distinction between literature which is complicit with domination versus that which resists it. I proceed in a similar direction, though I attempt to avoid the sharp binary opposition between complicity and resistance to domination, as I argue that oppression is more dynamic and fluid than such language implies. ;Our selves and our views may be constituted by relations of domination and/or resistance to domination, whatever explicit values we may maintain about human equality and justice. I critically examine some discussions of voice, diversity, and knowledge claims in selected feminist works on moral and epistemological questions. I build upon this critical examination to describe and argue for Satya P. Mohanty's 'realist-cognitivist' view as a moral-epistemological framework for moral attention. Moral attention combines social location theory, critiques of certain relativistic commitments, and analyses from 'resistant literatures' of moral-political liberationist projects. ;This framework contends with the multidimensionality of oppression and resistance, critically examining the complex relational natures of our social locations as a point of entry into understanding the world. Moral attention is a way to take greater responsibility for who we are and who we might become. To do this, we must engage critically with our own and others' views and experiences, using these as 'raw material' for developing transformative, resistant knowledge

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