Naïve Realism and the Colors of Afterimages

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (1):207-227 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Along with hallucinations and illusions, afterimages have shaped the philosophical debate about the nature of perception. Often referred to as optical or visual illusions, experiences of afterimages have been abundantly exploited by philosophers to argue against naïve realism. This paper offers an alternative account to this traditional view by providing a tentative account of the colors of the afterimages from an objectivist perspective. Contrary to the widespread approach to afterimages, this paper explores the possibility that the colors of afterimages are not ontologically different from “ordinary” colors and that experiences of afterimages fail to provide a motivation for rejecting naïve realism.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Size judgments of McCollough afterimages.Gerald M. Murch - 1969 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 81 (1):44.
Qualia realism.William S. Robinson - 2000 - A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
The Ontology of Some Afterimages.Bryan Frances - 2017 - In Steven Gouveia & Manuel Curado (eds.), Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Perspectives. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 118-144.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-10-17

Downloads
508 (#57,227)

6 months
126 (#43,906)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Vivian Mizrahi
University of Geneva

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The transparency of experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
Mental paint and mental latex.Ned Block - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:19-49.
A reply to my critics.George Edward Moore - 1952 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The philosophy of G. E. Moore. New York,: Tudor Pub. Co..

View all 30 references / Add more references