The Ontological Meta-Argument

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):331-334 (2004)
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Abstract

Would the Ontological Argument Greater Than Which None Can Be Conceived proue the existence of God? Might an ontological argument prove the actuality of the world (as Robert Nozick once suggested)? Should you believe that you’re actual, even if you’re not? And what happens if we attempt to answer these questions, having adopted Nozick’s mature view of the function of argument?

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Elijah Millgram
University of Utah

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