Supremacy of Ibn Sina’s Argument of Thruthful Ones over the Arguments for the Existence of God

Avicennian Philosophy Journal 17 (49):57-77 (2013)
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Abstract

The substance of ontological arguments, from Anselm’s version to its later versions in Islamic philosophy, is typically based on reclamation of the nature of actual existence of necessary being from its very concept. The research topic in the present article is not to criticize the above mentioned reasoning, but to prove the necessary being in itself from concept of being. We have come to the conclution that any attempt in order to prove or defend these arguments has been unsuccessful. Therefore, it is inevitable that we should by the assumption of an actual being to prove the existence of a necessary being which this characteristic is only implicit. Ibn Sina’s argument of necessity and possibility and ontological argument without building on it have no way of escaping from the concept of existence and proving the objective existence, let alone proving the existence of the necessary most high. The necessary and possibility of Ibn Sina by assumption of some being and with the help of negating sophistry and vicious circle tries to improve the actual existence of necessary being and is the origin of ontological argument, not an argument beside them. Finally, by philosophical analysis of the quality of perciving the concept of being and building it on sensual perception, it can be understood as a sign of the actualization of actual sensible being and from this point by annexing Ibn Sina’s necessity and possibility to it the actual existence can be reclaimed.

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