Random drift and the omniscient viewpoint

Philosophy of Science 63 (3):S10-S18 (1996)
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Abstract

Alexander Rosenberg (1994) claims that the omniscient viewpoint of the evolutionary process would have no need for the concept of random drift. However, his argument fails to take into account all of the processes which are considered to be instances of random drift. A consideration of these processes shows that random drift is not eliminable even given a position of omniscience. Furthermore, Rosenberg must take these processes into account in order to support his claims that evolution is deterministic and that evolutionary biology is an instrumental science.

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Roberta L. Millstein
University of California, Davis

Citations of this work

An explication of the causal dimension of drift.Peter Gildenhuys - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (3):521-555.
Determinism, realism, and probability in evolutionary theory.Marcel Weber - 2001 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S213-.

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