Holes, haecceitism and two conceptions of determinism

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (4):639--64 (1999)
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Abstract

In this paper I claim that Earman and Norton 's hole argument against substantivalist interpretations of General Relativity assumes that the substantivalist must adopt a conception of determinism which I argue is unsatisfactory. Butterfield and others have responded to the hole argument by finding a conception of determinism open to the substantivalist that is not prone to the hole argument. But, unfortunately for the substantivalist, I argue this conception also turns out to be unsatisfactory. Accordingly, I search for a conception of determinism that is both independently plausible and capable of blocking the hole argument

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Citations of this work

Structural Realism.James Ladyman - 2012 - In Ed Zalta, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
How to Be a Spacetime Substantivalist.Trevor Teitel - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (5):233-278.
The Hole Argument.Oliver Pooley - 2022 - In Eleanor Knox & Alastair Wilson, The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Physics. London, UK: Routledge. pp. 145-158.
Lawful Persistence.David Builes & Trevor Teitel - 2022 - Philosophical Perspectives 36 (1):5-30.

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References found in this work

New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
What is a Law of Nature?David Malet Armstrong - 1983 - Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Sydney Shoemaker.
What numbers could not be.Paul Benacerraf - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):47-73.
New Work For a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1997 - In David Hugh Mellor & Alex Oliver, Properties. New York: Oxford University Press.

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