Abstract

Received: 31/10/2018 | Accepted: 28/02/2019 There are many new philosophical queries about the moral status and rights of artificial intelligences; questions such as whether such entities can be considered as morally responsible entities and as having special rights. Recently, the contemporary philosophy of mind philosopher, Eric Schwitzgebel, has tried to defend the possibility of equal rights of AIs and human beings, by designing a new argument. In this paper, after an introduction, the author reviews and analyzes the main argument and then deals with four criticisms witch Schwitzgebel himself has presented and rejected and ultimately, the author presents and explains two new critiques against the argument. According to the writer, though the argument regarding his new criticisms and some other probable critiques is not convincing, or at least needs to be corrected, however, it holds appeal and raises questions and may open a new horizon for future questions and researches.[1] Keywords [1]. I consider it my duty to thank Tyler Burge, Eric Schwitzgebel, Sam Cumming and David Chalmers for their beneficial conversations and emails regarding Schwitzgebel’s argument and the two final critiques. Also I am very grateful to the reviewers for the Journal of Philosophical Theological Research for their precise comments.