An Argument for Modal Realism

In Klaas J. Kraay (ed.), God and the Multiverse: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Perspectives. New York: Routledge (2014)
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Abstract

I formulate an argument for a weak version of modal realism; to be precise, I argue that there are multiple (i.e., at least two) worlds that contain concrete entities. I conclude by discussing some implications the argument has for theism.

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Jason Megill
Bentley College

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Evil and the many universes response.Jason Megill - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (2):127-138.

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