Abstract

In his Introduction to McTaggart's Philosophical Studies , Dr. S. V. Keeling complains that in the interests of a prejudice in favour of science and scientific methods, Russell and his followers have denied the possibility of solving metaphysical problems without giving any philosophical reason for this proscription. And by “metaphysical problems,” Dr. Keeling seems to mean ethical problems about the amount of good and evil in the world, the nature of human beings and their destiny, the hopes of men about immortality, and hence the “ultimate analysis of Time,” etc. Science is not concerned with such problems, and moreover it is the business of philosophy to “justify” induction and cannot itself employ a scientific method. Dr. Keeling therefore urges a return to the rationalism of McTaggart and the attempt to solve such problems by the deductive method. I want to say why this seems to me impossible and why such problems are insoluble unless they can be interpreted empirically and left to the investigation of the special sciences. I shall refer first to the most important feature of present empirical philosophy, then discuss metaphysical and other deductive systems, and finally dispute McTaggart's claim that the Self must be known by acquaintance and not by description, which Dr. Keeling regards, mistakenly, as it seems to me, the final refutation of this part of “positivistic phenomenalism.“ By this procedure I do not intend to justify or defend analytic philosophy but merely to re-compare its method with that of McTaggart