Abstract

Moral Contractualism provides a compelling framework for understanding what we owe to each other and seems promising as a non-consequentialist intergenerational moral theory as well. However, the non-identity problem presents a critical challenge. Specifically, the question arises as to whether future individuals can have an objection against the principles allowing an act even if the future individual’s existence is contingent on this act and their lives will be worth living. A prominent response to this challenge is to understand the objections of future individuals in a "non-comparative" way. The idea is that, whereas future persons cannot object that they are made worse off by our actions, they can complain that they are made badly off in some sense. It remains unclear how to best understand such a position within Moral Contractualism, whether it offers a coherent solution to the non-identity problem, and whether its substantial implications are convincing. This paper critically examines the possibilities and limitations of a non-comparative contractualist approach, concluding that non-comparative wellbeing-based objections above the threshold of a life worth living are not plausible. Consequently, a non-comparative response to the nonidentity problem referring to the well-being of future persons can, at best, provide a partial solution for Moral Contractualists.