The how and why of approximating Bayesian ideals

Philosophical Psychology 37 (2):528-543 (2024)
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10.1080/09515089.2022.2104702

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Nicholas Makins
University of Leeds

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Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.
Belief gambles in epistemic decision theory.Mattias Skipper - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):407-426.

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