Abstract

Innovation is disruptive and a deeply social phenomenon. As a result, discussions of innovation in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition are often tightly bound up with concerns about individual freedom and pluralism, including pluralism about ethical values. In response, stakeholders looking to evaluate and assess ethical aspects of the innovation ecosystem are often driven to pragmatic approaches that utilize a set of ethical values that can be regarded as “free-standing,” or “thin” in the sense that they are not tied to any particular, substantive conception of the good. This set often includes values such as beneficence, nonmaleficence, respect for autonomy, fairness, and justice. Discussions focused on justice, however, are the least extensive and least well-developed. As a result, most approaches are well-suited to surfacing first-order or direct effects of the discrete activities of a relatively narrow set of stakeholders. Paradoxically, however, such analyses are often not well-suited to identifying and evaluating (a) quintessentially social or higher-order effects (such as network-level or institutional level effects), (b) the role of a larger number of stakeholders who shape the innovation ecosystem in more indirect ways, and (c) some of the positive ethical claims of individuals that are relevant to evaluating innovation. After articulating these shortcomings, I argue that they might be overcome by adopting a justice-led framework for evaluating innovation.