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Like a Bird on a Wire: Freedom to Be Free
Journal of Speculative Philosophy 36 (4):476-490 (2022)
Abstract
ABSTRACT Against a Kantian notion of freedom as autonomy, this article defends a conception of freedom that is relational, dependent, and experimental, and that operates without anything like a will. In the author’s view, freedom is a characteristic of a relation between a person and the world that allows for the predictable realization of specified ends, that is, a mode of power.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Freedom in the Age of Social Stupidity.Alain Beauclair - 2023 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 37 (1):117-134.
The End of Enlightenment Liberalism?Lawrence Cahoone - 2023 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 37 (1):81-98.
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