Learning from Kant: On Freedom

Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 75 (1):191-230 (2019)
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Abstract

This article analyzes Kant’s conception of freedom and discussions about it. It starts with Kant’s early works and his search for the ways to overcome the limitations of the views of freedom as independence from one’s own inclinations and from whims of others. Conception of moral freedom was developed in three formulations of the categorical imperative. Kant formulated the positive conception of freedom as the free capacity for choice. It asserts the unconditional value of the freedom to set one’s own ends. Autonomy of the will is the supreme principle of morality and a necessary condition of moral agency. Attention is paid to the discussions about outer and inner freedom, and the differences between those who argue for the relations of right to morality and those who deny this. In Kant’s philosophy, morality and right are intrinsically related. He criticized moral utilitarianism as related to servility and political paternalism, which lead to unfreedom. In today’s world, imperial designs and neototalitarian tendencies are two sides of the same coin. The article holds that the real alternative to the hegemon-centric order will be not for the dominating power to change hands, but for a world free from any hegemonic domination. It shows the relevance of Kant’s project of perpetual peace and cosmopolitan world order.

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