The epistemological import of morphological content

Philosophical Studies 169 (3):537-547 (2014)
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Abstract

Morphological content (MC) is content that is implicit in the standing structure of the cognitive system. Henderson and Horgan claim that MC plays a distinctive epistemological role unrecognized by traditional epistemic theories. I consider the possibilities that MC plays this role either in central cognition or in peripheral modules. I argue that the peripheral MC does not play an interesting epistemological role and that the central MC is already recognized by traditional theories

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Jack Lyons
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

Unconscious Evidence.Jack Lyons - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):243-262.
Perceptual Modal Justification.Michael Omoge - 2023 - Disputatio 15 (69):223-249.
Relies to our critics.David Henderson & Terence Horgan - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):549-564.

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References found in this work

Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.

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