A defence of prudential moralism

Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (2):161–170 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

abstract Moralism is often charged with being ineffective, rude, hypocritical, and intolerant. This article challenges all of those claims, first using evidence from social science to argue that moralism can be effective in changing others’ behaviour, serving as a remedy against the important problems of moral ignorance and weakness of will. Next, the apparent problems of rudeness, hypocrisy, and intolerance are argued to be either illusory or overstated. Finally, examples of unethical moralism are reviewed and a prudential type of moralism is differentiated and defended

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,394

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Moralism.Julia Driver - 2005 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (2):137–151.
Moralism and morally accountable beings.Craig Taylor - 2005 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (2):153–160.
On moralism.Robert Fullinwider - 2005 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (2):105–120.
The moralism of multiculturalism.Duncan Ivison - 2005 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (2):171-184.
American moralism and the origin of bioethics in the united states.Albert R. Jonsen - 1991 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16 (1):113-130.
The moral reality in realism.C. A. J. Coady - 2005 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (2):121–136.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
60 (#356,239)

6 months
15 (#207,985)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

Gentle murder, or the adverbial samaritan.James Forrester - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):193-197.
Folk concepts and intuitions: From philosophy to cognitive science.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (11):514-518.
Hyperactive ethics.Julia Driver - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):9-25.

Add more references