Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Platonism about mathematics (or mathematical platonism) isthe metaphysical view that there are abstract mathematical objectswhose existence is independent of us and our language, thought, andpractices. Just as electrons and planets exist independently of us, sodo numbers and sets. And just as statements about electrons and planetsare made true or false by the objects with which they are concerned andthese objects' perfectly objective properties, so are statements aboutnumbers and sets. Mathematical truths are therefore discovered, notinvented., Existence. There are mathematical objects

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reprint Linnebo, Øystein (2012) "Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics". In Zalta, Ed, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, pp. : Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2012)

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Øystein Linnebo
University of Oslo

Citations of this work

‘Just is’-Statements as Generalized Identities.Øystein Linnebo - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (4):466-482.
Epistemological objections to platonism.David Liggins - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (1):67-77.
Henri Poincaré.Gerhard Heinzmann - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

The logical basis of metaphysics.Michael Dummett - 1991 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Realism, Mathematics & Modality.Hartry H. Field - 1989 - New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.
Mathematical truth.Paul Benacerraf - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
What numbers could not be.Paul Benacerraf - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):47-73.

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