In Christoph Horn & Robinson dos Santos (eds.),
Kant’s Theory of Value. De Gruyter. pp. 217-240 (
2022)
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Abstract
As in the Doctrine of Right, Kant uses a principle in the Critique of Practical Reason according to which whatever diminishes the hindrances to an activity is a furthering of this activity itself. This is meant to help to determine a priori from concepts the modus operandi of the moral law, insofar as it is an incentive whose effect confers moral value on actions. I argue, first, that following a particular reading of what is meant by "hindrance," "resistance," and "furthering," this principle is likely to be false. This is because a hindrance obstructs an event or prevents it from taking place. By contrast, the removal of the hindrance or its absence merely permits or enables an event to occur. It does not bring it about. Preventing or disabling and furthering (in terms of "making happen") are not contradictory, but contrary opposites. Either, then, the furthering of an activity is to be understood as limited to enabling that activity by disabling its disablers or the notion of furthering presupposes a lot more than can be seen a priori, independently of such a presupposition. The latter would be question-begging. Second, I point out that the pre-critical writing on the Negative Magnitudes presents a Kantian solution to the motivation problem that, albeit not satisfactory, is more promising than that of the Second Critique.