Kantian Right and the Categorical Imperative: Response to Willaschek

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (4):541-556 (2012)
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Abstract

Abstract In his 2009 article "Right and Coercion," Marcus Willaschek argues that the Categorical Imperative and the Universal Principle of Right are conceptually independent of one another because (1) the concept of right and the authorization to use coercion are analytically connected in Kant's "Doctrine of Right", but (2) the authorization to coerce cannot be derived from the Categorical Imperative. Given that the principle of right just is a principle of authorized coercion, the fact that the authorization to coerce cannot be derived from the Categorical Imperative implies that the Principle of Right cannot be derived from the Categorical Imperative. Against this claim, I first argue that a satisfactory deduction of the concept of right can be constructed out of the Categorical Imperative, the fact that we are embodied, and the fact that we act from motives other than duty. I then argue that the insufficiency of the Categorical Imperative, by itself, to generate the Principle of Right does not prevent us from interpreting the Principle of Right as a specification of the Categorical Imperative. I develop this point by means of an analogy with Kant's discussion of the moral law and the Categorical Imperative in the Groundwork.

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Michael Nance
University of Maryland, Baltimore County

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Kant.Paul Guyer - 2006 - New York: Routledge.
Kant.Paul Guyer - 2007 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 69 (4):767-767.

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