A difficulty for Everett's many‐worlds theory

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (3):239 – 246 (1996)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Abstract An argument originated by Brandon Carter presents humankind's imminent extinction as likelier than we should otherwise have judged. We ought to be reluctant to think ourselves among the earliest 0.01 %, for instance, of all humans who will ever have lived; yet we should be in that tiny group if the human race survived long, even at just its present size. While such reasoning attracts many criticisms, perhaps the only grave one is that indeterminism means there is not yet any firm, theoretically predictable fact of how long the human race will survive. This, though, might not save Everett's many?worlds theory from a variant on Carter's point. Everett seemingly pictures observers as splitting into ever more versions, which explains away all apparent indeterminism; but then, absurdly, all except a vanishingly tiny proportion of one's versions would come into existence near one's death, outweighing all apparent evidence that death was not imminent. The need to avoid such a result severely constrains Everett?type theories. We need theories in which observer?versions diverge without increasing their numbers in any straightforward way

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,607

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Testing the Doomsday Argument.John Leslie - 1994 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 11 (1):31-44.
Observer‐relative chances and the doomsday argument.John Leslie - 1997 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):427 – 436.
Everett’s pure wave mechanics and the notion of worlds.Jeffrey A. Barrett - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):277-302.
The doomsday argument and the number of possible observers.Ken D. Olum - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):164-184.
The Doomsday Argument.John Leslie - 2009 - In Susan Schneider (ed.), Science Fiction and Philosophy: From Time Travel to Superintelligence. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 277–278.
The risk that humans will soon be extinct.John Leslie - 2010 - Philosophy 85 (4):447-463.
Everett's “Many-Worlds” proposal.Brett Maynard Bevers - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 42 (1):3-12.
Death.Shelly Kagan - 2012 - New Haven: Yale University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-02-01

Downloads
38 (#584,724)

6 months
5 (#1,015,253)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?