The supertask argument against countable additivity

Philosophical Studies 168 (3):619-628 (2014)
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Abstract

This paper proves that certain supertasks constitute counterexamples to countable additivity even in the frame of an objective (not subjective, à la de Finetti) conception of probability. The argument requires taking conditional probability as a primitive notion

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10.1007/s11098-013-0146-2

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Author's Profile

Jon Perez Laraudogoitia
University of the Basque Country

Citations of this work

On fair countable lotteries.Casper Storm Hansen - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2787-2794.

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References found in this work

Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.
Infinity.José A. Benardete - 1964 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press.
Countable additivity and the de finetti lottery.Paul Bartha - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):301-321.
A reply to new Zeno.Stephen Yablo - 2000 - Analysis 60 (2):148-151.
The form of the Benardete dichotomy.Nicholas Shackel - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):397-417.

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