Not knowing the “right thing to do:” Moral distress and tolerating uncertainty in medicine

Clinical Ethics 12 (1):37-44 (2017)
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Abstract

The four principles and consequentialism assist in teasing out moral dilemmas in medicine but often fail to account for the texture of our moral experience. In particular, these ethical approaches fail to account for the moral dilemma and the resultant distress. Conversely, by considering the relationships, emotionality, and motivations of human beings, Simone de Beauvoir's ethics of ambiguity furnishes a more robust ethical analysis and encourages a deeper understanding of how we actually negotiate relationships of care in medicine. I argue that moral distress not only reveals our need for a fuller understanding of intersubjectivity—one not on offer by principalism or consequentialism—but also exposes the deeply ambiguous and agonizing nature inherent in our relationships with others. A case study is presented and analyzed via de Beauvoir's ethics so as to broaden our understanding of ethical decision-making in medicine.

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