A relative defence: Lacewing A relative defence

Think 1 (3):71-77 (2003)
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Abstract

Is morality relative? Might what is morally ‘right’ for one culture be morally ‘wrong’ for another? Issue two contained two pieces arguing against this kind of moral relativism. Here, Michael Lacewing suggests that there may be more truth in relativism than was suggested.

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Michael Lacewing
University College London

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References found in this work

Whose Justice? Which Rationality?Alasdair C. MacIntyre - 1988 - University of Notre Dame Press.
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.Bernard Williams - 1987 - Behaviorism 15 (2):179-181.
Whose Justice? Which Rationality?Alasdair Macintyre - 1988 - Journal of Religious Ethics 16 (2):363-363.

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