Is AI a subject that can live together with humans?

AI and Society:1-8 (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article explores whether AI can be a human-like subject that can live together with humans. I argue that living together is conceptually different from being together or coexistence and symbiosis in an ecosystem. I propose three conditions for living together and consider as subjects only those beings that can live together in a cultural and inter-subjective way. And I try to define the subject as a being which can build its relationships with the world in three ways. Then the conditions of living together will be combined with the concept of subject. The first condition is that the subject should be conscious of its relationship with others. The second condition is that the subject should form reciprocal relationships with others. The third condition is that the subjects should have the same representation of the relationship with others. This article attempts to examine whether AI can fulfill the three conditions of living together. Although AI seems to be able to think, express, act, feel, even be conscious and so on, it is very unlikely that AI can build the same world as the human world. Therefore, even if we cannot discern ourselves from AI, we humans can never enter its world and vice versa. The reason is very simple: humans are ontically different from AI. In society, humans and AI can be together, but they cannot live together. Even if AI could eventually have a consciousness, genuine social living together between humans and AI is impossible. We humans can recognize AI as a pseudo-subject. Nevertheless, such a subject is not one that can live together with humans. Even if AI were conscious and could pretend to be a human-like subject, it could not be a genuine subject unless it could live together with humans. Many people warn that AI could be dangerous to humans. These so-called threats might not come from AI itself, but from humans themselves.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 104,899

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2025-03-31

Downloads
1 (#1,962,405)

6 months
1 (#1,611,079)

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Young Woo Kwon
Korea University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.
Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.

View all 17 references / Add more references