On the connection between lying, asserting, and intending to cause beliefs

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):643-662 (2025)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to one influential argument put forward by, e.g. Chisholm and Feehan, Pfister, Meibauer, Dynel, Keiser, and Harris, asserting requires intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say (first premise) and, because liars must assert what they believe is false (second premise), liars necessarily intend to cause their hearer to believe as true what the liars believe is false (conclusion). According to this argument, that is, all genuine lies are intended to deceive. ‘Lies’ not intended to deceive are not genuine lies because they do not involve assertions and you need to assert in order to lie. In this paper, I reject this argument by arguing that the first premise is false: intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say is not necessary for asserting.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 104,026

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

On the Connection between Lying, Asserting, and Intending to Cause Beliefs.Vladimir Krstic - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Lying to others, lying to yourself, and literal self-deception.Vladimir Krstić - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Can You Lie Without Intending to Deceive?Vladimir Krstić - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):642–660.
What Is Lying.Don Fallis - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (1):29-56.

Analytics

Added to PP
2025-01-17

Downloads
22 (#1,053,312)

6 months
22 (#138,733)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Vladimir Krstic
United Arab Emirates University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Common ground.Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5):701-721.
Studies in the Way of Words.Paul Grice - 1989 - Philosophy 65 (251):111-113.
Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions.H. Paul Grice - 1969 - Philosophical Review 78 (2):147-177.
Lying with Presuppositions.Emanuel Viebahn - 2020 - Noûs 54 (3):731-751.

View all 37 references / Add more references