Artificing intelligence: from isolating IQ to amoral AI

AI and Society:1-13 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Our contemporary moment is saturated by investments in artificial intelligence (AI). AI is not without its critics, many of whom hope to show why machines simply cannot be intelligent. Yet AI’s claim to intelligence is not dubious. Rather, what requires examination is the assumption that independent intelligence can help resolve our ethical–political problems instead of making them worse. Consider that AI exhibits a pair of tendencies commonly believed to be contradictory: success in passing validated behavioral tests of intelligence and manifesting ethical failures in the form of discriminatory and biased data analyses. The history of early-twentieth century psychometric sciences helps us see that these tendencies are far from contradictory. For that history shows that psychometricians designed tests in a way that relied upon the separation of intelligence from the measure of moral traits. This paper tracks the emergence of technologies and sciences of intelligence through the work of Lewis Terman and others as they disseminated their testing techniques in the domain of education in the 1920s. The wide deployment of intelligence tests in subsequent decades created the historical conditions for the viability of the inaugural work of Alan Turing on machine intelligence in the 1950s and beyond. The result is today's amoral AI.

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2024-12-18

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Colin Koopman
University of Oregon

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Rethinking Turing's Test.Diane Proudfoot - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (7):391-411.

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