- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Rejoinder to McGrath
Journal of Philosophical Research 36:243-246 (2011)
Abstract
In “Reply to King,” Sarah McGrath defends her argument for moral skepticism against my criticisms. Here I sketch some remaining reservations about the argument.Author's Profile
Other Versions
No versions found
My notes
Similar books and articles
Must a Successful Argument Convert an Ideal Audience?Xingming Hu - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (1):165-177.
Some Further Concerns with Colburn's Autonomy-minded Anti-perfectionism.John Patrick Rudisill - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37:243-248.
Moral perception, inference, and intuition.Daniel Wodak - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1495-1512.
Where does moral knowledge come from? [REVIEW]Hilary Kornblith - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (2):556-560.
Reflective equilibrium, considered moral judgments, and interests – a response to Thomas Kelly and Sarah McGrath.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
Sarah McGrath, "Moral Knowledge.". [REVIEW]Eric Wilkinson - 2021 - Philosophy in Review 41 (4):253-255.
Theodicy with a God of Limited Power: A Reply to McGrath.Michael B. Burke - 1986 - Analysis 47 (1):57 - 58.
Analytics
Added to PP
2011-12-02
Downloads
78 (#269,459)
6 months
11 (#352,895)
2011-12-02
Downloads
78 (#269,459)
6 months
11 (#352,895)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-648784bb4d-xlp8h uwo