Reine rechtslehre; einleitung in die rechtswissenschaftliche problematik

Leipzig und Wien,: F. Deuticke (1934)
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Abstract

Kelsen's 'Pure theory of law' was first presented in his fundamental work Hauptprobleme des Staatsrechtlehre (1911) and continued in both editions of Reine Rechtslehre (1934, 1958). Historically, it has a certain relation to John Austin's 'analytical jurisprudence', although Kelsen became acquainted with Austin's work for the first time in 1940. The 'pure theory of law' is a formal-logical analysis of law, considered as a system of norms, based philosophically on the strict distinction between 'is' and 'ought'. It is a normative and positive doctrine, opposed both to positivism, showing the limitations of the positivistic approach, the whole legal order. His positivism is a formal analysis of the legal norm, of its elements and of the architecture of the legal order. Kelsen's concentration on the form of law recognizes the legitimacy of sociological investigations and the study of values in reference both to the contents and the making of law. Equally, his philosophical relativism of values is entirely compatible with his strong stand for democracy and the ideals of western culture. German text.

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Citations of this work

On the (in)significance of Hume’s Law.Samuele Chilovi & Daniel Wodak - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):633-653.
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