Justification as truth-finding efficiency: How ockham's razor works

Minds and Machines 14 (4):485-505 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I propose that empirical procedures, like computational procedures, are justified in terms of truth-finding efficiency. I contrast the idea with more standard philosophies of science and illustrate it by deriving Ockham's razor from the aim of minimizing dramatic changes of opinion en route to the truth.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,388

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
254 (#108,185)

6 months
16 (#159,027)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

References found in this work

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Ian Hacking.
The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.Karl Popper - 1959 - Studia Logica 9:262-265.
Theory and Evidence.Clark N. Glymour - 1980 - Princeton University Press.

View all 32 references / Add more references