Bottom up justification, asymmetric epistemic push, and the fragility of higher order justification

Episteme 16 (2):119-138 (2019)
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Klemens Kappel
University of Copenhagen

Citations of this work

Logical Disagreement.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrews
Be modest: you're living on the edge.Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):611-621.

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References found in this work

Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.
Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.
Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.

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