Beliefs and Blameworthiness

Stance 7:7-17 (2014)
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Abstract

In this paper, I analyze epistemic blameworthiness. After presenting Michael Bergmann’s definition of epistemic blameworthiness, I argue that his definition is problematic because it does not have a control condition. I conclude by offering an improved definition of epistemic blameworthiness and defending this definition against potential counterexamples.

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Elizabeth Jackson
Saint Louis University

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References found in this work

The ethics of belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.
The Ethics of Belief.William Clifford - 2000 - In Brian Davies (ed.), Philosophy of religion: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
The unity of justification.Eugene Mills - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):27-50.

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