Taking It Not at Face Value: A New Taxonomy for the Beliefs Acquired from Conversational AIs

Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 28 (2):219-235 (2024)
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Abstract

One of the central questions in the epistemology of conversational AIs is how to classify the beliefs acquired from them. Two promising candidates are instrument-based and testimony-based beliefs. However, the category of instrument-based beliefs faces an intrinsic problem, and a challenge arises in its application. On the other hand, relying solely on the category of testimony-based beliefs does not encompass the totality of our practice of using conversational AIs. To address these limitations, I propose a novel classification of beliefs that shifts the focus from the properties of the conversational AIs themselves to how recipients perceive AI output, specifically whether they take the output at face value. The proposed categories are beliefs by regarding as instruments and beliefs by regarding as testifiers. By using these complementary categories, a more comprehensive understanding of beliefs acquired from conversational AIs can be achieved while avoiding the problems associated with the traditional classification.

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manuscript Iizuka, Shun (2024) "Taking It Not at Face Value: A New Taxonomy for the Beliefs Acquired from Conversational AIs". Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 28(2):219-235

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Shun Iizuka
University of Tokyo

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References found in this work

Testimonial Entitlement and the Function of Comprehension.Peter J. Graham - 2008 - In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 148--174.
Can Artificial Entities Assert?Ori Freiman & Boaz Miller - 2018 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 415-436.

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