Abstract

A singular thought can intuitively be understood as a thought that is directly about a particular thing, e.g., a non-conceptual thought about B.B. King, Mont Blanc, or your most beloved pet. The consensus within the singular thought literature has been that Gareth Evans (1982) develops a theory of singular thought throughout his posthumously published work The Varieties of Reference. However, Evans never claims to be developing a theory of singular thought, nor does the locution ‘singular thought’ appear more than a handful of times throughout the work. The singular thought literature lacks any substantial exegetical engagement with the theory of singular thought that Evans argues for — including an account as to why Evans should be interpreted as offering a theory of singular thought, as well as how he should be so interpreted. The interpretation of Evans that I wish to argue for is one according to which a singular thought (for Evans) is an object-dependent thought, the thinking of which requires the satisfaction of Russell’s Principle. Liberalism is the thesis that there is no general acquaintance constraint on singular thought. Many contemporary Liberalists, including semantic instrumentalists and cognitivists, are quick to argue that Evans’ theory of singular thought is incorrect. What I seek to demonstrate is that, armed with a proper understanding of Evans’ theory of singular thought, most recent Liberalist critiques of Evans are unsuccessful because they either misevaluate or misidentify the explicandum with which Evans was concerned.