Abstract

The aim of this text is to discuss a tension in the philosophy of language involving descriptive names. Descriptive names are those introduced or fixed in language through a definite description. The debate centers on whether the introduction of a name into discourse generates a new singular thought, i.e., a direct thought about an object that is not mediated by a definite description. Gareth Evans (1982) argues that descriptive names are incapable of producing singular thoughts, whereas David Kaplan (1989) contends that names introduced through a description do generate new singular thoughts. We will present two proposed solutions to this tension, those of Marga Reimer and Recanati. Both are considered attempts to reconcile the views of Evans and Kaplan. However, I will argue that these solutions are not truly reconciliatory. Lastly, I introduce a notion of singular thought inspired by Robin Jeshion (2010) and Imogen Dickie (2020), which establishes the focus of attention as the foundation for the formation of singular thoughts and explains how descriptive names can generate direct thoughts.