Brand Blanshard and Gewirth

Idealistic Studies 20 (2):155-168 (1990)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Gewirth's view that ethics is based on human rights is contrasted to Blanshard's view that human rights derive their support from ethics. For Blanshard intrinsic good is comprised of whatever both satisfies and fulfills human nature. Human rights and correlated duties depend entirely upon whether or not they foster this intrinsic good. For Gewirth, by contrast, human claim-rights, such as freedom and well-being, are the foundation of human agency required for moral action of any sort. Such rights, properly conceived, are the foundation and basis of ethics

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,945

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Human Rights as Universal Moral Rights.Chou Ren - 2009 - Philosophy and Culture 36 (7):71-88.
Orwell's 1984 Society and Human Rights.Wayne P. Pomerleau - 1989 - Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 1 (1-2):135-144.
[Book review] the community of rights. [REVIEW]George Rainbolt - 1999 - Business Ethics Quarterly 9 (2):361-375.
Justification of human rights: reconstruction of the problem.Н. І Сатохіна - 2016 - Вісник Нюу Імені Ярослава Мудрого: Серія: Філософія, Філософія Права, Політологія, Соціологія 1 (28):119-127.
Towards an action-guiding theory of human rights.Cristián Rettig - 2023 - Journal of Global Ethics 19 (2):206-220.
Dworkin’s Theory of Rights in the Age of Proportionality.Kai Möller - 2018 - The Law and Ethics of Human Rights 12 (2):281-299.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-01-09

Downloads
59 (#390,974)

6 months
10 (#365,128)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references