A new proof for the physical world

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (4):531-537 (1984)
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Abstract

A proof is offered according to which if a psychological premise held by many diverse philosophers through the centuries to the effect that any represented physical property will be held to be exemplified unless some conflicting physical property is simultaneously represented is considered to be necessary, then there are physical objects in every possible world.

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10.2307/2107618

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Walter Horn
Brown University (PhD)

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