Quiet bubbles

Abstract

Motivated by the recent subprime mortgage crisis, we explore whether speculative bubble models of equity based on investor disagreement and short-sales constraints can also provide an explanation for the overvaluation of debt contracts. We find that this is unlikely. Equity bubbles are loud: price and volume go together as investors speculate on capital gains from reselling to more optimistic investors. But this resale option is limited for debt since its upside payoff is bounded. Debt bubbles then require an optimism bias among investors. But greater optimism leads to less speculative trading as investors view the debt as safe and having limited upside. Debt bubbles are hence quiet-high price comes with low volume. We find the predicted price-volume relationship of credits over the 2003-2007 credit boom. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,173

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-03-18

Downloads
4 (#1,801,982)

6 months
2 (#1,686,184)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references