Abstract

Although our notion of induction stems from the Aristotelian epagoge, it was probably Cicero who first translated it into Latin as inductio. I argue that, despite occasional similarities, Aristotle’s epagoge is different from induction. In the first part, I point out the differences in epagoge’s function and nature. (1) Unlike induction, epagoge can proceed both from particulars to universals and the other way round, being an application of universals to particulars. (2) While induction is taken to be a means for how to obtain universals, epagoge finds universals already at its disposal before starting to work. (3) Although, like induction, epagoge may in some contexts be considered a kind of logical inference, it is rather an intuitive or perception-like ability or capacity providing the connection between particulars and universals. In the second part, I deal with what Aristotle calls καθόλου and καθ’ ἕκαστον. Although they are usually rendered as ‘universal’ and ‘particular’, on closer inspection, they turn out to be different from these modern terms. Their relationship is to be understood as that between a whole and parts.