Non-transitive Better than Relations and Rational Choice

Philosophia 48 (1):179-189 (2020)
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Abstract

This paper argues that decision problems and money-pump arguments should not be a deciding factor against accepting non-transitive better than relations. If the reasons to accept normative standpoints that entail a non-transitive better than relation are compelling enough, we ought to revise our decision method rather than the normative standpoints. The paper introduces the most common argument in favor of non-transitive better than relations. It then illustrates that there are different ways to reconceptualize rational choice so that rational choice is possible also when the relevant better than relation is non-transitive.

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Anders Herlitz
Institute for Futures Studies

Citations of this work

Rational Intransitive Preferences.Peter Baumann - 2022 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (1):3-28.
Incommensurability and population-level bioethics.Anders Herlitz - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (12):3219-3234.
What does incommensurability tell us about agency?Luke Elson - 2021 - In Henrik Andersson & Anders Herlitz (eds.), Value Incommensurability: Ethics, Risk. And Decision-Making. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 181-198.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Weighing lives.John Broome - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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