First-person experience cannot rescue causal structure theories from the unfolding argument

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Consciousness and Cognition 98:103261 (2022)
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10.1016/j.concog.2021.103261

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Adrien Doerig
Universität Osnabrück

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Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness.Keith Frankish - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):11-39.
Psychologism and behaviorism.Ned Block - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (1):5-43.
Consciousness cannot be separated from function.Michael A. Cohen & Daniel C. Dennett - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):358--364.
A framework for consciousness.Francis Crick & Christof Koch - 2003 - Nature Neuroscience 6:119-26.
Towards a true neural stance on consciousness.Victor Lamme - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (11):494-501.

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