N eo-F regeanism and Q uantifier V ariance

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):233-249 (2007)
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Abstract

In his paper in the same volume, Sider argues that, of maximalism and quantifier variance, the latter promises to let us make better sense of neo-Fregeanism. I argue that neo-Fregeans should, and seemingly do, reject quantifier variance. If they must choose between these two options, they should choose maximalism.

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Author's Profile

Katherine Hawley
PhD: Cambridge University; Last affiliation: University of St. Andrews

References found in this work

A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.
Frege's conception of numbers as objects.Crispin Wright - 1983 - [Aberdeen]: Aberdeen University Press.

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