Social Evidence Tampering and the Epistemology of Content Moderation

Topoi 43 (5):1421-1431 (2024)
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Abstract

Social media misinformation is widely thought to pose a host of threats to the acquisition of knowledge. One response to these threats is to remove misleading information from social media and to de-platform those who spread it. While content moderation of this sort has been criticized on various grounds—including potential incompatibility with free expression—the epistemic case for the removal of misinformation from social media has received little scrutiny. Here, I provide an overview of some costs and benefits of the removal of misinformation from social media. On the one hand, removing misinformation from social media can promote knowledge acquisition by removing misleading evidence from online social epistemic environments. On the other hand, such removals require the exercise of power over evidence by content moderators. As I argue, such exercises of power can encourage suspicions on the part of social media users and can compromise the force of the evidence possessed by such users. For these reasons, the removal of misinformation from social media poses its own threats to knowledge.

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Keith Raymond Harris
University of Vienna

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References found in this work

Experts: Which ones should you trust?Alvin I. Goldman - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):85-110.
Epistemic dependence.John Hardwig - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (7):335-349.
The philosophy of information.Luciano Floridi - 2010 - The Philosophers' Magazine 50:42-43.
Of conspiracy theories.Brian Keeley - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):109-126.

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