Abstract

This dissertation examines the question whether academic-industry relationships create secondary interests for involved scientists that conflict with ethical norms of academic research. It begins with the argument that trust is an important element in scientists' professional work, and that academic ethical norms arise in the context of the maintenance and enhancement of this trust. It examines the definition of the concept of "conflicts of interest," and applies that concept to current academic-industry relationships in the United States. Using a survey of 4000 biomedical science faculty in the fifty academic research institutions receiving the most funds from the National Institutes of Health, the dissertation then examines two hypotheses: a scientist's interests in industry relationships affect his attitudes favorably towards industry; and, as a scientist's interests in industry relationships increase, the scientist is likely to adhere less to the identified norms of academic science. ;Results demonstrate that scientists with more extensive relationships with industry have attitudes more favorably inclined towards industry. Several explanations for this association--"familiarity," "self-selection," and "common-cause"--are considered but found to be less consistent with the data than is the "conflicts-of-interest" explanation. It is found that a scientist's perceived secondary interests increase as her involvement with industry increases--in terms of the percentage of her research support, and in terms of the percentage of her income, coming from industry relationships. Also, as the scientist's interests in industry relationships increase, he is less likely to be concerned about these relationships compromising his objectivity, he is more likely to weigh commercial considerations in his choice of research topics, and he is more likely to cede publication control or to delay publication of his research results. It is argued these behaviors are not consistent with the classic academic norms of disinterestedness, academic freedom, and openness. ;The results are consistent with the hypothesis that academic-industry relationships create secondary interests for an involved scientist that may interfere with the scientist's judgment in the execution of his primary professional obligations. Implications for scientists, for academic institutions, and for public policy are discussed