Abstract

A utilitarian political theory not only can, but also must, take individual rights seriously if it is to have any chance at accomplishing the maximization of happiness. In order for a utilitarian state to maximize happiness, its citizens must be capable of becoming happy. Happiness, however, requires that the individual act in some way to become happy, no matter how happiness is otherwise defined. To be capable of action requires that the individual be an agent. To be an agent, the individual must have his biological needs and needs of agency satisfied. An individual cannot act if he is not alive, if he is not free from coercion before he acts, or if he is not free from coercion while he acts. Positive rights to biological needs and negative rights to needs of agency ensure that the individual is an agent. Once such rights are instituted and maintained, the utilitarian state's citizens become capable of happiness, after which state maximization of happiness can take place. ;This utilitarian political theory accomplishes the maximization of happiness by maximizing the state's citizens' opportunities to do as they wish after their biological needs and needs of agency have been satisfied by the institution and maintenance of positive rights to biological needs and negative rights to needs of agency. By justifying individual rights as indirectly productive of happiness, it successfully avoids the problems that plague traditional utilitarian theories of rights. Consideration of the nature of action, an integral part to happiness on any account of happiness, reveals the justification for moving from direct to indirect utilitarian argument. In doing so, the theory successfully answers the criticisms against moving from direct to indirect utilitarian argument, while at the same time providing an optimal account of rights that rivals contemporary non-utilitarian rights justifications