A Note in Defence of Ratificationism

Erkenntnis 75 (1):147-150 (2011)
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Abstract

Andy Egan argues that neither evidential nor causal decision theory gives the intuitively right recommendation in the cases The Smoking Lesion, The Psychopath Button, and The Three-Option Smoking Lesion. Furthermore, Egan argues that we cannot avoid these problems by any kind of ratificationism. This paper develops a new version of ratificationism that gives the right recommendations. Thus, the new proposal has an advantage over evidential and casual decision theory and standard ratificationist evidential decision theory

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Johan E. Gustafsson
University of Texas at Austin

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References found in this work

The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.
The Logic of Decision.Henry E. Kyburg - 1968 - Philosophical Review 77 (2):250.
Some counterexamples to causal decision theory.Andy Egan - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (1):93-114.
Stable and retrievable options.Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (4):624-641.
Decisions in Dynamic Settings.Paul Weirich - 1986 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:438 - 449.

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