Smokers and psychos: Egan cases don't work

Abstract

Andy Egan's Smoking Lesion and Psycho Button cases are supposed to be counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory. This paper argues that they are not: more precisely, it argues that if CDT makes the right call in Newcomb's problem then it makes the right call in Egan cases too.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

My notes

Similar books and articles

A Note in Defence of Ratificationism.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (1):147-150.
Push the Button.Arif Ahmed - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (3):386-395.
Causal Decision Theory is Safe from Psychopaths.Timothy Luke Williamson - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):665-685.
Regret and instability in causal decision theory.James M. Joyce - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):123-145.
Conditional causal decision theory reduces to evidential decision theory.Mostafa Mohajeri - 2024 - Analytic Philosophy 65 (1):93-106.
Smokers, Psychos, and Decision-Theoretic Uncertainty.William MacAskill - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (9):425-445.
On an alleged counter-example to causal decision theory.John Cantwell - 2010 - Synthese 173 (2):127-152.
Decision-theoretic paradoxes as voting paradoxes.Rachael Briggs - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):1-30.
Review of Arif Ahmed (ed.), Newcomb's Problem. [REVIEW]Jack Spencer - 2019 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2019.
Egan and agents: How evidential decision theory can deal with Egan’s dilemma.Daniel Dohrn - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1883-1908.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-10-18

Downloads
593 (#45,712)

6 months
87 (#71,595)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references